Non Random IV With CBC Mode

ID

java.non_random_iv_with_cbc_mode

Severity

critical

Resource

Predictability

Language

Java

Tags

CWE:329, NIST.SP.800-53, OWASP:2021:A2, PCI-DSS:6.5.1

Description

Use of a non-random Initialization Vector (IV) with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode can result in predictable ciphertext, exposing encrypted data to potential attacks. Ensure IVs are generated using a secure random number generator.

Rationale

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode combines using XOR blocks of plaintext with the previous ciphertext block before encryption, thus requiring an initialization vector (IV) for the first block. If IVs are reused, then identical plaintexts would be encrypted to identical ciphertexts. However, even if IVs are not identical but are predictable, then they still break the security of CBC mode against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA). To avoid this, use a fresh random IV for each message.

The same weakness with IVs happens with other modes like Cipher Feedback (CFB). But

Using a non-random or predictable IV with CBC mode can undermine the security of the encryption scheme, leading to potential vulnerabilities like distinguishing attacks or message deduplication attacks.

Poorly implemented IV handling often derives from static values or predictable patterns, compromising the confidentiality of sensitive data.

To clarify, consider the following Java code sample:

import javax.crypto.Cipher;
import javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
import java.util.Base64;

public class InsecureCBCExample {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        String plaintext = "SensitiveData";
        String key = "1234567890123456"; // Example key (AES-128 requires 16 bytes key)
        String iv = "1234567890123456";  // Insecure static IV

        Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
        SecretKeySpec keySpec = new SecretKeySpec(key.getBytes(), "AES");
        IvParameterSpec ivSpec = new IvParameterSpec(iv.getBytes());

        cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, keySpec, ivSpec);
        byte[] encrypted = cipher.doFinal(plaintext.getBytes());

        System.out.println("Encrypted Data: " + Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(encrypted));
    }
}

In this code, a static and predictable IV is used for AES encryption in CBC mode, significantly weakening the cryptographic strength of the system.

Remediation

Modern cryptography prefers in general Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) schemes, which provide both confidentiality and integrity, over classical confidentiality-only schemes, such as CBC, which are vulnerable to padding oracle attacks. First and foremost, use AEAD schemes such as AES-GCM or XChaCha20-Poly1305 if possible.

Modes such as Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) fail spectacularly when the IV (also called nonce) is reused: A single repeated nonce allows an adversary to recover the authentication subkey and learn the XOR of the two messages with the same nonce. If you use GCM, therefore, make sure to use a fresh nonce for each message. For details on generating fresh nonces for GCM, read NIST SP 800-38D.

To remediate vulnerable code using non-random IVs in CBC mode, always generate the IV using a secure random number generator for each encryption operation. The IV must be unpredictable and unique to mitigate the threats posed by static, reused, or predictable IVs. Always ensure the IV is stored or transmitted alongside the ciphertext, as it is needed for decryption.

In Java, you can use SecureRandom to create secure IVs:

import javax.crypto.Cipher;
import javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
import java.security.SecureRandom;
import java.util.Base64;

public class SecureCBCExample {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        String plaintext = "SensitiveData";
        byte[] key = retrieveKeyFromSecureLocation();

        // Securely generate a random IV
        SecureRandom secureRandom = new SecureRandom();
        byte[] iv = new byte[16]; // AES block size is 16 bytes
        secureRandom.nextBytes(iv);

        Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
        SecretKeySpec keySpec = new SecretKeySpec(key, "AES");
        IvParameterSpec ivSpec = new IvParameterSpec(iv);

        cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, keySpec, ivSpec);
        byte[] encrypted = cipher.doFinal(plaintext.getBytes());

        System.out.println("Encrypted Data: " + Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(encrypted));
        System.out.println("IV: " + Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(iv)); // Store or transmit this IV securely
    }
}

By using SecureRandom, the IV is unpredictable and unique for each encryption operation, mitigating the threats posed by static or predictable IVs. Always ensure the IV is stored or transmitted securely alongside the ciphertext, as its proper handling is crucial for successful decryption. This approach strengthens data confidentiality and reduces the risk of exposure to various cryptographic attacks.

References