User Controlled Primary Key

java.user_controlled_primary_key

Severity

high

Remediation Complexity

medium

Remediation Risk

medium

Remediation Effort

medium

Resource

Misconfiguration

Language

Java

Description

This vulnerability arises when an application uses user-supplied input to control primary key values for database queries or operations, which may lead to unauthorized data access or modification.

Rationale

When user input is directly used to build database queries, including primary keys, it can result in unauthorized access or manipulation of protected data.

This problem is particularly dangerous when primary keys are integers or predictable values, as it enables users to perform unintended actions like accessing records that belong to other users, potentially exposing or corrupting sensitive information.

For example, consider this Java code snippet:

String userId = request.getParameter("userId");

PreparedStatement stmt = connection.prepareStatement("select * from invoices where uid=?");
preparedStatement.setInt(1, id); // FLAW

preparedStatement.executeQuery();

In this example, the userId parameter is user controlled, which may allow a user to access data of any user simply by changing the userId value.

Remediation

To mitigate the risks of CWE-566, it’s essential to avoid constructing database queries using user-supplied input directly or allow user input to control database primary key values. Best practices include:

If the SQL query is constructed without relying on user-controlled input, such as through the use of parameterized SQL, attackers cannot access unauthorized records.

When the identifier legitimately comes from the request, authorize it against the caller: check that the record belongs to the authenticated principal, and prefer doing so before the lookup, so an unauthorized identifier never reaches the database.

Whether a given method of your own performs that authorization is project knowledge, not something recoverable from the code, so the rule cannot infer it. If you delegate the check to a helper, declare that helper as a neutralizer in a custom library metadata file (conf.custom/libraries/<technology>/*.yml), naming the argument that carries the identifier and the primary_controlled_key kind:

# schema: library_schema.json
name: acme-authorization
technology: java
modules:
  - name: acme
    classes:
      - name: com.acme.security.AccessGuard
        functions:
          - name: validateUser
            neutralizations:
              - argPos: [0]
                kind: primary_controlled_key

Identifiers validated through the declared helper are then no longer reported. An inline check that is not declared this way stays reported, because nothing in the code distinguishes it from an unrelated comparison.

Configuration

The detector has the following configurable parameters:

sources, that indicates the source kinds to check.
neutralizations, that indicates the neutralization kinds to check.

Unless you need to change the default behavior, you typically do not need to configure this detector.

References

CWE-566 : Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled SQL Primary Key.