NIST IR 8547 - Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards

Checks that a cryptographic inventory (a CBOM) has been established for the project — the foundational prerequisite of any post-quantum migration programme.

You cannot migrate what you have not inventoried. NIST SP 1800-38 (the NCCoE "Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography" practice guide) makes discovery and inventory of cryptography the first migration activity, and regulatory regimes (EU 2026 governance milestone, PCI DSS 4.0 req. 12.3.3) require an explicit cryptographic-asset inventory. Without one, the absence of findings is indistinguishable from the absence of discovery.

Xygeni passes the checkpoint when a non-empty cryptographic inventory is available — ingested from a CycloneDX CBOM supplied with --cbom or produced on demand by the crypto-asset detector — and reports how many of the assets carry a quantum-risk classification. It fails when no inventory was produced, directing the user to enable crypto discovery.

Generate a cryptographic bill of materials for the project: run Xygeni’s crypto-asset discovery (or supply an existing CycloneDX CBOM) and keep it current, so cryptographic assets can be assessed against the post-quantum transition timeline.

Checks the project’s cryptographic inventory for quantum-vulnerable (Shor-broken) public-key cryptography — RSA, elliptic-curve schemes (ECDSA, EdDSA, ECDH), finite-field Diffie-Hellman and DSA — and evaluates it against the NIST IR 8547 transition timeline: such algorithms are deprecated from 2030 and disallowed after 2035.

Shor’s algorithm breaks classical public-key cryptography on a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer; unlike symmetric primitives there is no key-size mitigation, so every use is a migration target. Confidentiality and key-establishment uses are additionally exposed to "harvest now, decrypt later" — traffic captured today can be decrypted once such a machine exists — so those assets are prioritised. Reporting the inventory against the regulatory timeline turns detection into a ranked, auditable migration backlog rather than a flat list.

Xygeni assembles the cryptographic inventory either from a CycloneDX CBOM supplied with --cbom or by running the crypto-asset detector over the sources, classifies each algorithm’s quantum risk, and fails the checkpoint when Shor-broken algorithms remain past the disallow date, reports a partial result while they remain before it (migration debt, harvest-now-decrypt-later first), and passes when none are present.

Migrate quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms to the NIST-standardised post-quantum schemes — ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key establishment and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) for signatures, with SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) as a conservative signature alternative. During the transition a hybrid (classical + PQC) construction is permitted. Prioritise long-lived confidential data and key-establishment uses.